An Apologia For Rhetorical Violence
OK, my good intentions to blog again several months ago were fruitless (a phenomenon I’ve become accustomed to in my life) but I’m going to try again, this time I’ll begin with an actually substantial post rather than a triumphant announcement of intentions: One runs into many instances of the term “rhetorical violence” these days and I think it ought to be parsed. If usage determines meaning than most often the term seems to mean something like “illegitimate rhetorical advantage.” That is, one has performed the discursive act (speech, written letter, etc…) such that it can function as truth (i.e. influence others) when it ought not do so. The simplest example here would be screaming. As the oldest of five brothers I perfected the art of screaming stupid things to other people in such a way that they had to listen to me, even though I was quite often saying things that did not deserve to be listened to. The performance of such an act of “rhetorical violence” seeks to be recognized as truth even as the speaker knows it is not truth. Rhetorical violence of this sort works because actual truth is listened to by all people due to our being made in the image of God.
If one does not mean “illegitimate rhetorical advantage” when one speaks of “rhetorical violence” than the concept seems to be untenable (at least as a criticism) for all those who are not pacifists. To cite categorically some examples I’ve run into frequently in recent days (which probably motivated me to write this): the Christian claim to ultimate universal relevance (i.e. the orthodox gospel is true and applicable to the entirety of creation) is not (necessarily) rhetorically violent in the above sense, simply becaue it argues its point such that its methodology suggests no validity that is not already assumed in the actual message itself. To give an example of what I’m saying, its not rhetorically violent (given the above sense) for a missionary to go to some locale and preach to un-Christians because the belief that un-Christians ought to be preached to is inherent to the gospel being preached. If that missionary were Doestoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor (who does not believe the gospel and proclaims it as a means to maintain his/her own social power), however, the proclamation of the gospel to un-Christians would in fact be rhetorically violent.
Now that I’ve belabored that point to death let me wrap this up with a brief elaboration of my above comment pertaining to rhetorical violence and pacifism. Only pacifists can coherently say that the above missionary example is in fact an instance of rhetorical violence because only pacifists can coherently say that any instance of force (rhetorical force or otherwise) is de facto innaproppriate to human interaction. Furthermore, this hypothetical pacifist would need to be a hardcore convert, a straithup kick-my-Grandmother’s-ass-and-take-her-money pacifist, no compromises, because of all instances of violence we must admit that the rhetorical variety is on the less drastic side of the spectrum.
So what we’ve really got here is a deconstruction of Christian pacifism. If one wants to actually be a pacifist, and one finds forcefel language that purposes to persuade to be distasteful (which seems to be the only lexically responsible way to understand the rhetorical violence everyone finds so offensive), one must include any as an instance of rhetorical violence any claim to truth that seeks to be recognized by other people who don’t want to hear it. Want to speak truth to power? That’s rhetorical violence my friend, you’ve attempted a mastery over the thoughts and actions of the power-holders that they do not want you to have. Given this understanding of rhetorical violence (which only the pacifist can coherently hold to) there is no more violent instance of rhetoric than the act of Christian conversion, confession and baptism. Even this, however, is no more rhetorically violent than is the claim that Christian conversion is rhetorically violent (since this is also a truth claim). Let the infinite digression begin! Pacifists, it seems, cannot make truth claims to other people who don’t want to hear them and still be pacifists.
Since most people aren’t pacifists, the point here is simple. One can’t coherently criticize a statement for actually being rhetorically violent (and if one means that a statement takes an illigitemate rhetorical advantage perhaps it ought to be characterized with this language instead because it is more precise). What the non-pacifist ought to do instead is attempt to align her thoughts and words with truth such that the instances of rhetorical violence commited will be worthwhile and just.
